New York Post
http://www.nypost.com/
September 22, 2009
GEN. Stan McChrystal, an honorable soldier, has reported from Afghani stan: He wants more troops for a "classic" counterinsurgency strategy to secure the population, then win hearts and minds.President Obama needs to make a decision: Either give the general the resources he believes he needs, or change the mission.
I'm for changing the mission. Concentrate on the continued destruction of al Qaeda and its allies. Nothing else matters in this mess.
Last spring, the president handed McChrystal an impossible mission: Turn Afghanistan into a prosperous, rule-of-law democracy cherished by its citizens. The general's doing his best. But we have zero chance -- zero -- of making that happen.
Meanwhile, we've forgotten why we went to Afghanistan in the first place. (Hint: It wasn't to make nice with toothless tribesmen.) Here's a simple way to conceptualize our problem: A pack of murderous gangsters holes up in a fleabag motel. The feds raid the joint, killing or busting most of them. But some of the deadly ringleaders get away.
Should the G-men pursue the kingpins, or hang around to renovate the motel? Common sense says: Go after the gangsters. They're the problem, not the run-down bunkhouse.
Yet, in Afghanistan, we've put the bulk of our efforts into turning a vast flophouse into the Four Seasons -- instead of focusing ruthlessly on our terrorist enemies. It's politically correct madness.
What we really need is just a compact, lethal force of special operators, intelligence resources and air assets, along with sufficient conventional forces for protection and punitive raids. More troops just mean more blood and frustration.
Those who suggest pulling out completely and striking from offshore don't understand the fundamentals, either: We still need some boots on the ground, within grabbing distance of Pakistan's wild northwest, to strike fast to kill or capture elusive targets. And cruise missiles can't bring back prisoners, DNA samples or captured documents.
Our hunter-killer task forces should be deployed on a limited number of strategically positioned bases supported by air. Don't worry about the Afghan government -- Afghans don't.
The other alternative -- sending still more troops to die for Washington's fantasy of a Disney-World Afghanistan -- is disgraceful. Stop building sewage systems. Take scalps.
What of the notion that a surge could turn Afghanistan around since a surge worked in Iraq? Iraqis switched loyalties (temporarily) because al Qaeda turned out to be a far less pleasant occupier than we were. We were lucky in our enemies.
But the Taliban's the home team in much of Afghanistan. The dominant ethnic group, the Pashtuns, won't turn against the Taliban because they are the Taliban.
Then there's the subfantasy of "training up" the Afghan military and police (who, after eight years of our efforts, remain operationally ineffective and abysmally corrupt).
A great old soldier recently reminded me that it took us eight years to build a capable South Vietnamese army (which was then betrayed by Democrats in Congress). The difference is that, except for the Montagnards and other back-country folk, Vietnam didn't have tribes.
The Vietnamese had a unified ethnic identity. In Afghanistan, we're asking Hutus to fight for Tutsis and Hatfields to guard McCoys.
During the Soviet occupation, there was a serious Afghan military of over 300,000 men equipped with tanks and helicopters. At their peak strength, the Soviets themselves had almost 140,000 troops and tens of thousands of civilian advisers on the ground. Moscow still lost -- and not just because of the Stinger anti-aircraft missiles we gave the mujaheddin (a core group of whom became the Taliban).
The Soviets and their Afghan cronies lost because their enemies were willing to sacrifice more -- to give their lives for their heritage, however backward and cruel.
Afghans are willing to fight. They're just not willing to fight for us.
Ralph Peters' new novel is "The War After Armageddon."
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